Yemen’s harrowing transition (al-Monitor)

Concrete barriers are seen near the British Embassy in Sanaa, Dec. 12, 2013.  (photo by REUTERS/Mohamed al-Sayaghi)


The surveillance video released Dec. 11 of the hospital attack in Yemen’s capital was received with dejection and incredulity. The barbarism inflicted on unarmed civilians in the hospital inside the Ministry of Defense complex shattered all projections of a stable Yemen.

One of the assailants shown in the video was disguised in a military uniform, brazenly shooting nurses who were pleading for help, and then scurrying to the hallway of the hospital to kill doctors and patients in cold blood. His moves were robotic, like a senseless machine from a horror movie.

The release of the closed circuit television (CCTV) footage infuriated many Yemenis mourning their dead. That this mayhem was belligerently constructed to shatter the state authority confronted the public with the brutal reality of political brinksmanship. While initial reactions assumed al-Qaeda was behind the attack, this has the flair of sectarian revenge and political payback. More attention needs to be paid to the treacherous alliances between the former regime that has gripping, bureaucratic loyalty, and the different local and regional political actors in Yemen.

The attack came just a week after Yemeni news outlets reported the kidnapping of 10 patients who had been transported from Dammaj to the military hospital. Reports described Houthis entering the hospital camouflaged in army uniforms to carry out their mission. There were no reports of an investigation, or precautions taken to fortify security after these events. These operations show an aptitude in evading detection and avoiding widespread security barriers and checkpoints, which suggests that elements within the government are possibly complicit in the attacks.

The style of this attack pointed to al-Qaeda as the culprit in this pandemonium. Many Yemenis, however, feel that assigning the blame to al-Qaeda (which has long been in cahoots with the former regime) is an attempt to conceal the real players and motivations behind this horrific operation. The offensive has brought awareness to the possible complicity of a range of actors who are vehemently striving to find a political path to control Yemen, whether directly or indirectly. 

The lack of interest from the United States in investigating the incident and the failure to predict the attack brings up the topic of partnership. Yemen’s allies are not entirely comfortable disclosing information when it comes to security cooperation. The Saudis do not share intelligence, the British hide behind optimism and the United States, presumably fighting Yemen’s war with al-Qaeda, is motivated by a kill list rather than a reasonable security strategy. And although its allies are working to save Yemen’s honor from the label of “failed state,” they are inclined to circumvent Yemeni government systems instead of addressing the need for reform, thereby treating Yemen as a failed state, but without allocating sufficient resources appropriate for building up the institutional capacities of Yemen.

Most importantly, some intelligence cooperation with the Yemeni authorities could have prevented the morning headlines from reading “air strike kills 15 at wedding.” The US drone operation on Dec. 13 came a week after Yemen’s national tragedy in Sanaa had shaken perceptions of safety and security. This attack further weakened an already fragile situation and drew attention to the multiplicity of actors in Yemen’s security arena. Death in Yemen is now more imminent by the hands of al-Qaeda or the United States.

Increasingly worrying, however, is the alleged role of Saudi Arabia in the current events.  While the kingdom extends diplomatic support and has often saved Yemen economically, it is an active employer of tribal allegiances. Yemenis do not feel entirely grateful for the lopsided relationship that has often dispensed charity while creating instability.

Moreover, the lack of cooperation between both countries in matters of security gives Yemenis reason to doubt the kingdom’s intentions. Various Yemeni and Arabic media outlets have reported a rising pressure from Saudi Arabia on President Hadi over the border agreement and oil exploration contracts around al-Jawf governorate. Contention on these issues have allegedly led Saudi Arabia to empower the Houthis, striking an alliance that fueled the conflicts in the northern city of Dammaj.

Saudi nationals’ involvement in the attack has given credence to the theory that Yemen’s neighbor is one of the main drivers in Yemen’s instability. Yemen’s initial investigation, which pointed to a “majority” of Saudi assailants in the hospital, and the capture of others demonstrates a shift in the Yemeni-Saudi relationship. The government’s eagerness to focus on the foreign/Saudi element of the attack signaled President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi’s resoluteness on standing strong against regional threats, which may not really bode well for him.

Adding to an already fragile situation is the state of fury in the south of Yemen following the killing of prominent Hadrami tribal Sheikh Saad bin Habrih at a military checkpoint. This was the straw that broke the camel’s back and led to a leadership conference between southern dignitaries and tribal elites, who gave the government of Yemen an ultimatum of 10 days to deliver the killers of the sheikh, remove government outposts inside the cities and withdraw from all military barracks and camps around Hadhramaut. Former Yemeni President Ali Salem al-Beidh has incited Hadrami leaders to use the necessary force if the government failed to deliver. He called on tribes to govern themselves and remove the military checkpoints and barricades around their cities and take control of oil installations in their region.

But just how far are southern leaders willing to go? The situation in the south of Yemen is conspicuously heightened, and the threats should not be taken lightly. Members of the Hirak secessionist movement, which has been increasing steadily since 2007, have expressed their solidarity with the Hadramis, and they all appear to be willing to pay the price for their freedom. The restoration of the southern state’s former parameters is made more possible now, courtesy of the increasing violent incidents in Yemen, and the highly disconnected National Dialogue, which began in Sanaa in March this year.

The National Dialogue is now in a prolonged political uncertainty, which could further thrust opposite sides further away from each other as they work on raising the ceiling of their demands. That and the possibility that a renewed focus on the dialogue could result in further chaos instigated by armed groups seeking to exploit everyone's focus on the dialogue to advance their own agendas.

More than ever, the Yemeni government needs proactive involvement by its allies on sharing information that could lessen the impact of violence and chaos. This could be done through coordination on drone targets to prevent the killing of innocents (or better yet, uphold the law through prosecuting the suspects) or through economic assistance that would enable reforms and focus on the security and stability of the country. The greatest challenge facing the donors is making progress in providing such economic assistance without having to retract it because of the security situation. Donors will have to prioritize the search for more sustainable solutions that will engage the Yemeni people and get them invested in their communities.

This is no time for donors in Yemen to dither. Terror operations are getting bolder and more pernicious, and unless there is quick thinking and real partnership between Yemen and its allies, further instability will stifle the progress of the national dialogue. It is not too late for the Friends of Yemen to share a viable strategy that will help the government deal with instability. Donors could also take a proactive role in the southern issue and drop their fruitless and unnecessary opposition toward the southern secession. As political brinksmanship has painfully succeeded in driving Yemen to the edge, Yemenis hope that their allies will pull it to safety, rather than push it over the cliff

Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/12/yemen-national-dialogue-uncertainty.html#ixzz2nW5Gu7tJ

Yemen’s quandary in Dammaj - By Fatima Abo Alasrar | The Middle East Channel

Yemen’s quandary in Dammaj - By Fatima Abo Alasrar | The Middle East Channel

After years of intermittent violence in the northern provinces of Yemen, political machinations are outpacing the state countermeasures that are mired in indifference and complacency. While the capital, Sanaa, claims to make headway through the National Dialogue, brutal attacks in Sadaa governorate between the Salafis and Houthis have left a significant death toll. The Yemeni government has chosen its usual modus operandi response to the protracted conflict through actively playing a part in the acrimonious disputes over territory and sphere of influence.

Sadaa has been an arena for political gamesmanship and power control since the Houthi rebellion started in 2004. Former President Ali Abdullah Saleh sent the military to fight the Houthis while equipping them with artillery in order to prolong the conflict and weaken the forces of General Ali Mohsen in the Yemeni army. After the Arab Spring, the Houthi movement evolved from a rebellion against the former regime, into a conflict with political parties that are increasingly marred by sectarian divisions, regional meddling, and a complex tribal dimension. The intentions of all factions are clearer now than they have ever been. Political alliances are forming in a way that is increasing the onslaught on the Houthis in order to curb their expanding political influence in Yemen. 

While it is not entirely clear who the protagonist was in the recent violent events in the town of Dammaj, Yemeni officials have expediently assigned responsibility for the conflict to the Houthis, prior to launching any investigation. Such conspicuous political bias from the government is escalating the situation, leading to further disastrous reactions in Sadaa. This government-sponsored scenario of the conflict is purposefully constructed to stir national consciousness in favor of one side, the Salafis. The Dammaj students who were caught in the battle are exalted to martyrdom status, pictures of their dead are published in newspapers and websites, while there is almost nothing reported on the Houthis besides their violent role and support from Iran. 

Although the Houthis have been demonized in this process, they are not the benevolent altruistic group either. Houthis claim that the Sadaa-based Dar al-Hadith institute in the city of Dammaj, which hosts unarmed Salafi scholars from all around the world, is heavily militarized. Furthermore, the institute recently benefitted from the protection of tribes and Islah party affiliates in the area, which have opted to respond belligerently to limit the Houthi's influence in Sadaa. In fact, these were not the first skirmishes around Dammaj. Salafis fighting alongside the government in the former six wars of Sadaa caught the attention of the Houthis and prompted retaliation. The Houthis sought to trammel the Salafis' influence in Dammaj in 2011 by laying siege to the entire area from October to December 2011 and cutting off food and medical access. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reported more than 100 people killed in the conflict, including four children who died of starvation and three elderly men of lack of medication.

Sanaa, however, is intimidated by the rising Houthi influence and organized military ability. The Houthis' power in Sadaa and their independent governance structure have allowed them to negotiate border security agreements with their main adversary, Saudi Arabia. This is all causing further discomfort to the policymakers in Yemen, as they grow aware of the unexpected groundswell that the Houthis generated. The Houthis are now emerging with their own political party, which is becoming increasingly popular among the Yemeni youth.

The Houthis influence need not be underestimated. While ostensibly regressive, Houthis believe that ruling is a privilege for Zaidi sects of Hashemite origin. Zaidism was the order of the day in Yemen for more than a millennia, and the Zaidi imamate rule was removed in the 1962 revolution and is likely to see a resurgence amid the prevailing corrupt political culture in Yemen.

At the heart of the Houthis' allure to the Yemeni youth is the realization that the Arab Spring revolution did not reach its full potential. While the head of the regime is gone, elements of a remaining dysfunctional system threaten a relapse. As such, there are more youth than before who are supporting the Houthis for their unrelenting opposition to the former regime and its allies. Furthermore, the Houthi notion of state sovereignty appears to many to be far better than what is currently offered by the Yemeni state where infringement on Yemen's territory has taken place with the connivance of Yemeni officials.

Meanwhile, the Houthis do not invite international sympathy with their narrow vision, nor do they seek it. Their "death to America" slogan has been a recruiting factor for the radically inclined. But if the relationship between the United States and Iran changes positively, this will have implications on the Houthi movement, which could find itself reinventing its messages to suit the political winds of Iran. It is more likely, however, that the Houthis will remain one of Iran's cards to play in the region. As the Obama administration is tinkering with its Iranian counterparts, Yemeni politicians feel the urgency to stop the Houthi movement before it transforms into a political power that the current ruling alliances cannot face.

Undoubtedly, Dammaj has tested the sincerity and commitment of the Yemeni government in its ability to protect all Yemeni citizens and contain a crisis. As the government falters, the political parties grow more confrontational. All sides of this conflict appear to be deliberately drawing more attention to themselves in a conspicuous effort to garner additional financing and recruits while the Yemeni government assumes the role of a victim, rather than an interceptor of the violence which has further inflamed the situation in the north.

Furthermore, communities in the south are watching this tragedy with fear that it could repeat itself in their neighborhoods. Southern political parties and media have tilted toward the Houthis in their reporting. The Houthis-Southern alliance, which intensified after the Arab revolution and southerners' call for session, is starting to become a nuisance for the policymakers in the capital who were used to conducting their business the "Saleh" way.

Events in Dammaj have also prompted the Group of Ten Ambassadors of the permanent five members of the U.N. Security Council, the GCC, and the European Union to issue a statement that called upon all sides to stop fighting and defuse the tensions. But most importantly, they called on the Yemeni government to resume its mediation attempts and to take whatever measures are necessary to restore security and the state's presence. The government sent a presidential committee to investigate the situation on November 6 but this came after the death toll surpassed 200 people. The question for international partners is if they are willing to be creative enough to find complementary ways to support Yemen's near-ending transitional process while helping the government address urgent needs of the community.

The current security threats in the north and the antipathetic responses by the state challenge assurances that the Yemeni government is on the right track. The effort to sustain peace should be long term, as Yemen cannot afford to have the same military conflicts experienced during the Saleh regime. Recognizing that Sadaa has some degree of autonomy and a unique culture that needs to be preserved peacefully is the first step toward real integration. But most importantly, bearing the responsibility to protect the people in Sadaa, just as much as the people in Dammaj, is crucial if the state wants to gain respect and influence.

Hailing Hellfires - On drones and Human Rights Watch Report

Hailing Hellfires

BY FATIMA ABO ALASRAR

A destroyed building as a result of fighting between AQAP and the Yemeni government in 2012, taken in June 2013. (Photo: Fatima Abo Alasrar)

Apart from the Yemeni National Dialogue Conference that has been generating good news in the press, the country is on a rapidly deteriorating course toward uncertainty. On October 18, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) launched a suicide attack targeting a military installation in al-Ahwar district of Abyan governorate which killed twelve soldiers and left several others wounded. This  was the same governorate that fell under control of the terrorist group of Ansar al-Sharia during the Arab Spring uprising in 2011. Despite the liberation of Abyan from the terrorist occupation, the group still conducts terrorist acts, through planting land mines in schools, kidnapping aid workers, in addition to their usual suicide tactics against military installations and local popular committees that guard the city.

The danger of AQAP in Yemen is real, but so are the drone attacks which intensified during the Obama administration. The weapon meant to target terrorists  caused great harm to Yemen in a number of ways. Human Rights Watch issued a report on October 22 highlighting the devastating effects of air strikes. The report examined six drone strikes since 2009. Although the number of investigated cases is not a representative quantitive sample on the drone strikes in Yemen (various sources document an estimated eighty-two to ninety-two drones attacks during this period), the qualitative sample made one important point abundantly clear: no matter how precise the drones, they still generate civilian casualties, destruction, fear, trauma, motherless children, loss of income, and increasing rage towards the United States.

The report did not intend to hold the United States accountable for extrajudicial killings or its violation of Yemen’s state sovereignty (it would have been futile to highlight the latter given that Yemeni President Abdrabbo Mansour Hadi is a proponent of drones). Rather, it criticizes President Barack Obama’s administration for its failure to provide a clear legal justification for the targeted killings and calls on the US government to respond to alleged violations of international law in individual attacks. Human Rights Watch questioned the US administration’s compliance and commitment to international humanitarian law under the drone program, and questioned the legal framework for US intervention in Yemen, viewing it as a party to an armed conflict between the Yemeni government and AQAP. 

President Obama’s speech at the National Defense University in May this year attempted to highlight drones as an efficient weapon of war, arguing that the precision of these weapons minimizes civilian casualties. But this instrument fails when it uses false or insufficient intelligence that leads to the killing of innocent civilians. In one of the six cases, the report sheds light on the death of a cleric who worked vigilantly to weaken the influence of AQAP by denouncing them in his sermons. In another case, a drone missile hit a minibus that killed a pregnant woman, three children, and eight other people. Not only was the intended target absent from the vehicle, but also his affiliation with a terrorist organization was never substantiated. No matter how much the Obama administration emphasizes its desire to curb civilian casualties by using drones, a trail of unintended consequences and a number of unaddressed cases fall in the policy’s wake.

Evaluating the impacts of drones is difficult in absence of concrete data and information regarding the nature of attacks, targeting, and response. The failure of the Yemeni government to acknowledge these cases and the lack of transparency on this issue threatens to offset the foundation of a democratic system though the National Dialogue Conference. Citizens will dismiss the dialogue so long as their government remains unwilling to face its responsibility towards communities affected by drones.

The United States is reticent in acknowledging the operations conducted in Yemen and therefore fails to compensate victims when damages occur. This  has generally given  the  perception that US policymakers are  indifferent towards the suffering of civilians, as if anyone in the vicinity of terrorists is fair game in the interest of US national security. The human cost of the drone program is weighing less on the consciousness of Washington, and the Yemeni government for that matter. 

The sad reality is that the Yemeni government does not advocate for scrutiny of the air strikes and many argue it even actively inhibits the discussion on drones. President Hadi, a former military man, has welcomed drones with open arms, and millions of Yemenis feel powerless in the face of this unconditional embrace for Hellfire missiles. As more and more Yemenis fall victim to the policy, they  increasingly view the United States as an asymmetrical force that can only be challenged by terrorism. In the broader context of those interpreting it as targeting Muslims as opposed to terrorists, more misunderstandings and violence will inevitably follow.

The US projection of power in Yemen stokes the fires of anger and resentment in many communities even among non-extremists, that generates the mental conditioning required for recruitment. This sense of powerlessness provides AQAP with its breeding ground to challenge the security interests of the United States and Yemen—the exact opposite effect for which the drone program was born. Human Rights Watch highlighted AQAP’s ability to capitalize on the lack of accountability towards civilian casualties through AQAP’s various propaganda outlets.

As long as Yemen continues to accept drones, stability will be a remote possibility. Drones have weakened the capacity of Yemeni districts to achieve their economic potential in an already difficult economic environment. Local communities in many cities in Yemen, most notably Abyan, repudiate the presence of AQAP. The city of Moodiya, for example, has armed itself against AQAP and stopped them from entering their district in 2011. The United States could invest in these communities without a single US soldier or drone missles. This engagement does not require arming popular committees, but rather through targeted economic and education assistance that could aid these communities in defeating the conditions in which terrorists thrive.

The United States must not wait any longer to reconsider a change of policy in Yemen. Without swift action to address the issue of metastasizing extremists, there will neither be a foreseeable halt to AQAP operations, nor the subsequent drone attacks meant to stop them. The United States must find a way to empower the Yemeni government to work with its citizens and consider the prospect of working with local popular committees. A revival of democracy programs is needed, not only with civil society, but with the Yemeni government that has a fundamental responsibility to seek the wellbeing of its people, will help prevent the persistent cycle of violence.

Yemen can no longer afford to be trapped between al-Qaeda and Hellfire missiles. Yemenis need a real partnership with the United States in order to combat the challenges threatening their stability. The United States also must realize that assisting the Yemeni government with upholding the rule of law and bringing terrorists to justice will strengthen the people's faith in the National Dialogue. It is imperative to move the Yemen-US relationship from its dysfunctional series of one night stands to a long term cooperation effort that will respect the lives and dignity of Yemeni citizens.

Fatima Abo Alasrar is an independent Middle East policy analyst from Yemen and a former OSI International Policy Fellow.

This blog was initially posted in the Atlantic Council, MENA source http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/hailing-hellfires

On the National Dialogue, and Yemen reality.

If one thinks about Yemen problems, it is almost impossible to see a way out. This is why the National Dialogue seems to be the only hope for the country. But the question here is whether the National Dialogue is truly capable of healing the wounds of the nation, or is just prolonging the inevitable. Experts are overzealous about the process for it presents a civil, comprehensive solution (Read Bob Sharp and Fahd Malaikah Commentary: Stand by Yemen | The National Interest .) The majority of Yemenis, however, do not see themselves as part of this process.

For me, this speaks to the culture of representation, or lack thereof in Yemen. People get elected in parliaments, but their constituents barely know them or how to use them. For Yemen, parliamentary seats are party seats. People vote because they have an incentive in seeing their party wins, for some, its a believe in an ideology, but for many, it is about the cutbacks and perks they receive when their party wins. Even down at the local council levels, people suffer from the "lack of representation" syndrome. The majority of local council members play a role that is similar to a counselor or a social worker --that is only if they were being good about their jobs--. They have no power that enables them to make real change in the community, but they put a band aid on the wounds of their people, and perhaps give them a sense that they are not neglected.

People in the National Dialogue are trying hard. They are working seriously, and if entire Yemen functioned that way, then it will be saved. But the question of representation remains. No matter how many people in the Southern committee join, some of the most important elements are out. This is not to say that the National Dialogue did not attempt to try to reach out to people like al-Beidh, it is simply that al-Beidh doesn't want to play within the confines of something that could look like a stable Yemen. Who supports al-Beidh? Sadly, the entire South with the exception of al-Islah in the South.

Yemenis pulled through and avoided conflicts before but it is important to remember that the former regime controlled crisis. This cannot be said for the current government that is simply trying to cope with crisis. Amid all the complicated issues, the desire to look for solutions outside of the system, and give them time for implementation becomes the only logical issue. The hype over the National Dialogue, and most recently "federalism" reflects a desire to find quick solutions for perennial problems. Forcing these solutions will come at a heavy cost for Yemenis.

The International Crisis Group understands this too well. In their report on the Southern Question, the ICG warned that "forcing through a final settlement in circumstances where basic trust, legitimacy

and consensus are lacking" could be problematic for Yemen. ICG warned that " It likely would further discredit the process, strengthen more militant Southern views and provoke dangerous brinkmanship and bloodshed." Yemenis do not necessarily understand this, and the international community is eager to make Yemen a success story by often undermining the complexity of implementation that will ensue after the National Dialogue. Yemen is taking this one day at a time, but this is a way to run a 12 Step program, not a country.

Meanwhile, Yemen's economic and security situation is not stagnant, it is on a sharp decline. The Dutch journalists that were kidnapped are almost forgotten (prayers go to them), a German diplomat was killed while a development worker from UNICEF was kidnapped right from the streets of Sana'a. Under directives from competing powers in Yemen, al-Qaeda operates selectively: Suicide bombers killed about 12 soldiers today in an attack in al-Ahwar, Abyan . Yemen is not going to implode, Yemen is imploding. Sana'a will remain the capital, the pride and joy of Yemeni elites, the ever so patient, and ambivalent.

Myopic solutions to chronic problems. Aid effectiveness in Yemen Aug 2013

This paper offers a close analysis of the key challenges facing the foreign aid sector in Yemen, and presents recommendations to the government of Yemen and the international donor community to make aid to Yemen more effective.

Read More: ‘Myopic solutions to chronic problems’? Aid effectiveness in Yemen - See more at: http://www.demdigest.net/blog/2013/08/myopic-solutions-to-chronic-problems-aid-effectiveness-in-yemen/#sthash.PGKWBYa5.dpuf

Yemen’s Fitful Dialogue - By Fatima Abo Alasrar | The Middle East Channel

Yemen’s Fitful Dialogue - By Fatima Abo Alasrar | The Middle East Channel

Yemen’s fitful dialogue

Posted By Fatima Abo Alasrar  Friday, September 6, 2013 - 4:20 PM 

It wasn't too long ago when Yemen launched its ostensibly inclusive National Dialogue process. The conference, which started on March 18, was meant to mend the wounds of the society and lead to the promulgation of the Yemeni constitution. But whoever thought that six months were sufficient for reconciliation and change was overly ambitious. The conference uncovered deep-rooted differences that confounded its participants and further polarized discussions, leading to a further indefinite delay.

In order to salvage the situation, the government of Yemen issued a statement on August 21 apologizing to the people of the southern, eastern, and northern provinces of the country for the wars and military campaigns launched during the Saleh regime. At the outset, the move seemed to be mature and reconciliatory, but it had counter effects on the ground. The apology came across as insipid at a time when the government has been either aggressive or ambivalent toward these areas. To make matters worse, the government exerted no effort in conducting consultations on the draft prior to issuing the statement. If it had done so, it would have probably been advised to remove some of its belligerent language that has inflamed, rather than quelled, the fury of many Yemenis. 

There is little evidence that the current government is capable of addressing different societal grievances that were unleashed after the Arab Spring uprisings. Yemen is imploding in more than one region: The Southern secessionist Hirak movement is controlling the South, the Tihami Hirak movement recently emerged to protest the disenfranchisement of its region, and the Northern city of Sadaa has been left to fight the Salafis with minimal protection from the government. Other cities like Marib and al-Jawf, which were previously out of control, still maintain their dangerous reputations. The government and Friends of Yemen have shown that their attention is focused on the political process in Sanaa, and have scant ability when it comes to responding to crisis outside of the capital.

The National Dialogue turned into a self-indulgent process more concerned with placating politicians than serving people. As pressure on achieving a successful outcome mounts, politicians resort to striking deals that are incongruent with their constituencies. This is conspicuous in the case of the Southern representatives who were cherry picked to advocate for federalism, in lieu of the right of self-determination, for which the majority of the South is asking.

It is perhaps time to realize that the great expectations of the National Dialogue Conference that were envisaged at the beginning need to be tempered. At the start of the process, policymakers felt that this is the only way to save the country from a real crisis, and as such downplayed any challenges. The international players, too, were eager to present Yemen as a successful case for the Arab Spring, remaining unusually positive on the dialogue. While some level of overzealousness at the start of the dialogue was expected -- as well as the lethargy toward the end -- the polarization that followed was not. Yemen today is more divided and further from a consensus than it was six months ago.

In the halls of the Movenpick hotel, the National Dialogue Conference comprises an impressive gathering of different strands of Yemeni elites with a disenchanting sense of partisanship. It is akin to walking into a spectacular wedding where no one wants to get married. Granted that top intellectuals, activists and civil society groups are present, the majority of these participants (besides the 10 percent parliamentarians) are not people who would get elected at any given point in time. Power and influence in the Movenpick reside with individuals who either have party affiliation or had former cabinet positions.

The General People's Congress and Islah Party representatives have an astute alliance in the conference; they both are firmly focused on reducing the rising threat of the Houthis who seem to have garnered a countrywide popularity that could challenge them at polling stations. As such, Sanaa based politicians trivialize issues that seem to be less threatening. Fiery and contentious politics such as the secessionist demands in the South are exclusive to the Southern region, which does not constitute any electoral majority. Southerners are outnumbered demographically, represented by different polarizing figures, and their plight is isolated from the majority. This is all too convenient for elites in the capital who sideline Southern politics, frequently capitalizing on the leadership divide among the Southern ranks.

There is a crisis of confidence intensifying in the National Dialogue and spilling over to the country. Mainstream politicians may show humility, but they cunningly exercise control. Just recently, senior Northern-based leaders from the National Dialogue cobbled together some deals purportedly to save the dialogue process and the future of the country; this was done without the inclusion of all participants, especially the Southerners who felt betrayed and protested the "cooked-up process." As a result, around 85 Southern representatives suspended their participation from the dialogue based on the secretive nature of informal coalitions. The absence of the Southern participants now is filling the dialogue with ambiguity and caused a further delay to the process, which was supposed to end this month.

It is well known that the South is now beyond the control of the government of Yemen. The Southern street is rife with resentment over the current economic situation and fraught with instability. There is a protest in the South at every national and symbolic Yemeni holiday calling against unity. The ongoing rage is fuelled by current and former Southern leaders who vehemently believe in secession. But what exactly is the government doing to bridge the gap with the South? Absolutely every wrong action from the authoritarian handbook. The government ostensibly promises development and change, while hiding, minimizing, and dismissing the desire of the South for self-determination.

Many activists believe that the call for secession is a tactic intended only to raise the bar high in order to score points in the negotiations over federalism. Given the only two choices between secession and federalism, the latter appears to be the lesser of two evils. But if federalism is the only option for Yemen, the street has certainly not caught up with it. Furthermore, the National Dialogue has done very little to explain the haphazard ideas for federalism to the public. Many regions in Yemen desire some sort of administrative and financial autonomy but are fearful that a federal system will still not protect them from the greedy elites who have always managed to find creative ways to exploit their people.

The National Dialogue should tread carefully when it comes to negotiating the new administrative plans. The past period raised enough red flags that should prompt an assessment on the effectiveness of this process: there is reluctance in achieving consensus, delay in decision making, and secretive deals among participants which have broken confidence in the process. As it is, the current design of negotiations risks political positions hardening. Furthermore, the political focus overshadowed the economic reality. In order to show real commitment to change, the government of Yemen and donors including the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) will have to work at making an economic investment that extends outside of Movenpick-land to the real one.

Fundamentally, the process needs to shift toward making the government of Yemen work for the people through providing much needed basic services while working on the constitutional process. More attention has to be given to the polarizing politics of the North-South divide. The first step is acknowledging that this divide exists; otherwise Yemen will find itself conceding political space to extremists of every stripe who appear to be more in tune with the frustrated society.

Fatima Abo Alasrar is an independent Middle East policy analyst from Yemen and a former OSI International Policy Fellow. This article was first published in Foreign Policy on September 6, 2013

Yemen's Real Blackout

Hundreds of thousands gathered in Sahat al-Aroud, in Aden, to show their support for southern independence, May 21, 2013. (photo by Fatima Abo al-Asrar)

By: Fatima Abo al-Asrar for Al-Monitor Posted on May 31.

Apart from constant power outages, a mercurial National Dialogue in the capital, and the unpredictable threat of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Yemen appears relatively settled in its usual state of dysfunctional normalcy. Yet just a day before the country’s national celebrations of North-South unification, hundreds of thousands arrived in Aden from all corners of the South calling for independence. The protests, which were organized by the secessionist movement al-Hirak, began on the morning of May 21 and lasted until midnight. Needless to say, Yemeni national television did not broadcast or announce the event. The only foreign correspondent covering the protests was a reporter for a Russian television channel.

About This Article

Summary : The transitional government in Sanaa appears to be repeating past mistakes and approaches in dealing with southern secessionist movements. Author: Fatima Abo al-AsrarPosted on: May 31 2013 Categories : Originals  Yemen  Security

At a time of high democratic rhetoric brought to the region by the Arab Spring, not much has changed for the South of Yemen. An alarming crackdown on freedom of expression by the transitional government since President Ali Abdullah Saleh was ousted in 2011 shows no sign of easing any time soon. In March 2012, the offices of Al Jazeera  and al-Arabiya were raided, with bureau chiefs interrogated over the coverage of southern unrest. The Committee to Protect Journalists reported on its website that Fathi bin Lazrek, editor-in-chief of Aden al-Ghad, received an anonymous death threat on May 7. The message urged him to stop his reporting on the South or risk having his newspaper’s premises burnt down — with him inside.

Despite its current state of general disorganization, the transitional government has become quite creative in its suppression of national movements. Rather than outright confrontation, it engages a variety of ploys to isolate movements from international attention, fearing that more “traditional” tactics of using force might garner unwarranted attention and sympathy for such groups. The new policy involves media blackouts of events combined with the intimidation of reporters, preventing them from visiting the South. Checkpoints in Lahj and Abyan have also been fortified with central security officers in an attempt to stop protesters reaching Aden. Some of these officers exchanged gunfire with protesters the day before the May 21 demonstrations.

The scenario is worryingly reminiscent of the 2003 Houthi rebellion in the North, where an uprising, for ideological and political reason, took hold of the city of Sada'a, igniting a war that cost thousands of lives. Rather than having a calming effect, information blackouts in Sada'a galvanized many people in Yemen against Houthis while intensifying their feelings of alienation, prompting the movement to seek alliances with aggressive regional actors and thus further exacerbating conflict. It is disconcerting that the transitional government expects the same tactics used ten years ago to yield different results vis-à-vis the southern movement today.

The dominant chants during the demonstration in Aden were not the kind that Sanaa would like to hear: “No to dialogue, no to negotiations — We are an independent Southern nation!” But in reality, southerners do not need to chant it out loud to make it true: There is no trace of government in the South. Aden may boast some central security and military police at checkpoints, but places like Lahj, Yafa'a, al-Dhala'a and Abyan have no real government presence beyond governorates offices and bill pay service centers. Even police offices are deserted in the majority of these areas. The situation in the South today is a far cry from its former position of prosperity two decades ago.

While it is understandable that government officials are concerned about the influence of secessionist voices, their deliberate intimidation of domestic and international journalists is unacceptable. Someinternational non-governmental organizations operating in the South are careful not to voice opinions on sensitive “internal affairs” issues for fear of retribution from the government.

But who, exactly, is acting on behalf of the “government” now? The current government is comprised of a loose coalition of individuals with divergent political and economic interests, most often unilaterally pushing their own party agendas. Nevertheless, it is no secret that the main drivers of official public policy within the current transitional government are a mélange of Islah party affiliates desperately seeking to strengthen their grip on the South along with disgruntled former security forces long accustomed to employing intimidation and repression to enforce their will. The majority of the southerners refer to this largely unsavory association as the “Tribal Militia of Government.”

Assassination campaigns are intensifying, such as the sophisticated murder of former southern air force officers that took place on May 8 in Daba village in Lahj. The three brigadiers — Talal bin Shihab, Mohsen al-Bagdadi and Nasser Abdullah — were killed in cold blood, and the event was falsely pinned on AQAP initially before local pressure mounted for an investigation. The pervasiveness of human rights violations in the South and lack of response from the international community has led the majority of southerners to believe that they have been completely abandoned in their struggle.

As far as the international community is concerned, secession is an extremely unappealing prospect. Yemen is potentially threatened by an unstable Somalia to its left, a peculiar interest from Iran in both the Houthis and Hirak, and an al-Qaeda recurring presence. At this stage in Yemen's political development, no one is in a position to turn their back on the National Dialogue process that started in March. The international community is furthermore not inclined to spend resources outside the capital on a precarious southern gambit.

Regardless of al-Hirak's secessionist logic, a population that feels disenfranchised is not in anyone's interest. The South is angry and impatient about the lack of visibility and the politicization of their desire for independence. That the government is discussing the southern cause in the capital, yet unable to take notice of the political dynamics in Aden, raises doubts on the legitimacy and purpose of the National Dialogue.

Furthermore, the violations that occurred in the South during the time of transition by security forces and small elites have further inflamed al-Hirak and encouraged the movement to seek alliances with external forces and anachronistic leaders. The government's ambivalence toward the South has helped in opening up the space for spoilers, mainly the former southern president Ali Salem al-Beidh, who is intent on achieving his objectives for secession through any and all possible means.

Some officials in the capital contend that the current southern crisis is driven by a selfish desire of southerners to keep their resources to themselves, implying that secession is a product of greed and opportunity. Sanaa, however, is not maintaining its firm grip on the South out of sheer benevolence either: Oil and gas resources exported from the South have been the backbone of the Yemeni economy for more than 20 years. The government of Yemen understands too well that the southern region has a strong potential for further untapped extractive resources. A disunited Yemen, therefore, would primarily impact the capital and its periphery, which has long been the primary beneficiary of the country’s wealth.

Meanwhile, the tally of southern grievances steadily increases. The government of Yemen needs to deal with movements seeking to control the South, and investigate allegations of human rights violations. The international community should also resist the temptation to ignore al-Hirak to appease Sanaa, which is likely to encourage the government to sidestep the opposition, thereby pushing al-Hirak to align with forces of aggression. They must acknowledge the possibility that Yemen may not be the successful Arab Spring model as once envisioned by its leaders. The current political inertia in the South is bound to break, with dangerous consequences. Official censorship and repression will backfire against the capital, and lead Yemen toward the bleak path of conflict that it is trying to avoid.

Fatima Abo al-Asrar is an independent Middle East policy analyst from Yemen and a former OSI International Policy fellow. Pamela Kilpadi, a doctoral researcher with the University of Bristol School for Policy Studies, contributed to this article. This article first appeared in al-Monitor on May 31, 2013

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