Yemen’s harrowing transition (al-Monitor)

Concrete barriers are seen near the British Embassy in Sanaa, Dec. 12, 2013.  (photo by REUTERS/Mohamed al-Sayaghi)


The surveillance video released Dec. 11 of the hospital attack in Yemen’s capital was received with dejection and incredulity. The barbarism inflicted on unarmed civilians in the hospital inside the Ministry of Defense complex shattered all projections of a stable Yemen.

One of the assailants shown in the video was disguised in a military uniform, brazenly shooting nurses who were pleading for help, and then scurrying to the hallway of the hospital to kill doctors and patients in cold blood. His moves were robotic, like a senseless machine from a horror movie.

The release of the closed circuit television (CCTV) footage infuriated many Yemenis mourning their dead. That this mayhem was belligerently constructed to shatter the state authority confronted the public with the brutal reality of political brinksmanship. While initial reactions assumed al-Qaeda was behind the attack, this has the flair of sectarian revenge and political payback. More attention needs to be paid to the treacherous alliances between the former regime that has gripping, bureaucratic loyalty, and the different local and regional political actors in Yemen.

The attack came just a week after Yemeni news outlets reported the kidnapping of 10 patients who had been transported from Dammaj to the military hospital. Reports described Houthis entering the hospital camouflaged in army uniforms to carry out their mission. There were no reports of an investigation, or precautions taken to fortify security after these events. These operations show an aptitude in evading detection and avoiding widespread security barriers and checkpoints, which suggests that elements within the government are possibly complicit in the attacks.

The style of this attack pointed to al-Qaeda as the culprit in this pandemonium. Many Yemenis, however, feel that assigning the blame to al-Qaeda (which has long been in cahoots with the former regime) is an attempt to conceal the real players and motivations behind this horrific operation. The offensive has brought awareness to the possible complicity of a range of actors who are vehemently striving to find a political path to control Yemen, whether directly or indirectly. 

The lack of interest from the United States in investigating the incident and the failure to predict the attack brings up the topic of partnership. Yemen’s allies are not entirely comfortable disclosing information when it comes to security cooperation. The Saudis do not share intelligence, the British hide behind optimism and the United States, presumably fighting Yemen’s war with al-Qaeda, is motivated by a kill list rather than a reasonable security strategy. And although its allies are working to save Yemen’s honor from the label of “failed state,” they are inclined to circumvent Yemeni government systems instead of addressing the need for reform, thereby treating Yemen as a failed state, but without allocating sufficient resources appropriate for building up the institutional capacities of Yemen.

Most importantly, some intelligence cooperation with the Yemeni authorities could have prevented the morning headlines from reading “air strike kills 15 at wedding.” The US drone operation on Dec. 13 came a week after Yemen’s national tragedy in Sanaa had shaken perceptions of safety and security. This attack further weakened an already fragile situation and drew attention to the multiplicity of actors in Yemen’s security arena. Death in Yemen is now more imminent by the hands of al-Qaeda or the United States.

Increasingly worrying, however, is the alleged role of Saudi Arabia in the current events.  While the kingdom extends diplomatic support and has often saved Yemen economically, it is an active employer of tribal allegiances. Yemenis do not feel entirely grateful for the lopsided relationship that has often dispensed charity while creating instability.

Moreover, the lack of cooperation between both countries in matters of security gives Yemenis reason to doubt the kingdom’s intentions. Various Yemeni and Arabic media outlets have reported a rising pressure from Saudi Arabia on President Hadi over the border agreement and oil exploration contracts around al-Jawf governorate. Contention on these issues have allegedly led Saudi Arabia to empower the Houthis, striking an alliance that fueled the conflicts in the northern city of Dammaj.

Saudi nationals’ involvement in the attack has given credence to the theory that Yemen’s neighbor is one of the main drivers in Yemen’s instability. Yemen’s initial investigation, which pointed to a “majority” of Saudi assailants in the hospital, and the capture of others demonstrates a shift in the Yemeni-Saudi relationship. The government’s eagerness to focus on the foreign/Saudi element of the attack signaled President Abed Rabbo Mansour Hadi’s resoluteness on standing strong against regional threats, which may not really bode well for him.

Adding to an already fragile situation is the state of fury in the south of Yemen following the killing of prominent Hadrami tribal Sheikh Saad bin Habrih at a military checkpoint. This was the straw that broke the camel’s back and led to a leadership conference between southern dignitaries and tribal elites, who gave the government of Yemen an ultimatum of 10 days to deliver the killers of the sheikh, remove government outposts inside the cities and withdraw from all military barracks and camps around Hadhramaut. Former Yemeni President Ali Salem al-Beidh has incited Hadrami leaders to use the necessary force if the government failed to deliver. He called on tribes to govern themselves and remove the military checkpoints and barricades around their cities and take control of oil installations in their region.

But just how far are southern leaders willing to go? The situation in the south of Yemen is conspicuously heightened, and the threats should not be taken lightly. Members of the Hirak secessionist movement, which has been increasing steadily since 2007, have expressed their solidarity with the Hadramis, and they all appear to be willing to pay the price for their freedom. The restoration of the southern state’s former parameters is made more possible now, courtesy of the increasing violent incidents in Yemen, and the highly disconnected National Dialogue, which began in Sanaa in March this year.

The National Dialogue is now in a prolonged political uncertainty, which could further thrust opposite sides further away from each other as they work on raising the ceiling of their demands. That and the possibility that a renewed focus on the dialogue could result in further chaos instigated by armed groups seeking to exploit everyone's focus on the dialogue to advance their own agendas.

More than ever, the Yemeni government needs proactive involvement by its allies on sharing information that could lessen the impact of violence and chaos. This could be done through coordination on drone targets to prevent the killing of innocents (or better yet, uphold the law through prosecuting the suspects) or through economic assistance that would enable reforms and focus on the security and stability of the country. The greatest challenge facing the donors is making progress in providing such economic assistance without having to retract it because of the security situation. Donors will have to prioritize the search for more sustainable solutions that will engage the Yemeni people and get them invested in their communities.

This is no time for donors in Yemen to dither. Terror operations are getting bolder and more pernicious, and unless there is quick thinking and real partnership between Yemen and its allies, further instability will stifle the progress of the national dialogue. It is not too late for the Friends of Yemen to share a viable strategy that will help the government deal with instability. Donors could also take a proactive role in the southern issue and drop their fruitless and unnecessary opposition toward the southern secession. As political brinksmanship has painfully succeeded in driving Yemen to the edge, Yemenis hope that their allies will pull it to safety, rather than push it over the cliff

Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/12/yemen-national-dialogue-uncertainty.html#ixzz2nW5Gu7tJ

Yemen’s quandary in Dammaj - By Fatima Abo Alasrar | The Middle East Channel

Yemen’s quandary in Dammaj - By Fatima Abo Alasrar | The Middle East Channel

After years of intermittent violence in the northern provinces of Yemen, political machinations are outpacing the state countermeasures that are mired in indifference and complacency. While the capital, Sanaa, claims to make headway through the National Dialogue, brutal attacks in Sadaa governorate between the Salafis and Houthis have left a significant death toll. The Yemeni government has chosen its usual modus operandi response to the protracted conflict through actively playing a part in the acrimonious disputes over territory and sphere of influence.

Sadaa has been an arena for political gamesmanship and power control since the Houthi rebellion started in 2004. Former President Ali Abdullah Saleh sent the military to fight the Houthis while equipping them with artillery in order to prolong the conflict and weaken the forces of General Ali Mohsen in the Yemeni army. After the Arab Spring, the Houthi movement evolved from a rebellion against the former regime, into a conflict with political parties that are increasingly marred by sectarian divisions, regional meddling, and a complex tribal dimension. The intentions of all factions are clearer now than they have ever been. Political alliances are forming in a way that is increasing the onslaught on the Houthis in order to curb their expanding political influence in Yemen. 

While it is not entirely clear who the protagonist was in the recent violent events in the town of Dammaj, Yemeni officials have expediently assigned responsibility for the conflict to the Houthis, prior to launching any investigation. Such conspicuous political bias from the government is escalating the situation, leading to further disastrous reactions in Sadaa. This government-sponsored scenario of the conflict is purposefully constructed to stir national consciousness in favor of one side, the Salafis. The Dammaj students who were caught in the battle are exalted to martyrdom status, pictures of their dead are published in newspapers and websites, while there is almost nothing reported on the Houthis besides their violent role and support from Iran. 

Although the Houthis have been demonized in this process, they are not the benevolent altruistic group either. Houthis claim that the Sadaa-based Dar al-Hadith institute in the city of Dammaj, which hosts unarmed Salafi scholars from all around the world, is heavily militarized. Furthermore, the institute recently benefitted from the protection of tribes and Islah party affiliates in the area, which have opted to respond belligerently to limit the Houthi's influence in Sadaa. In fact, these were not the first skirmishes around Dammaj. Salafis fighting alongside the government in the former six wars of Sadaa caught the attention of the Houthis and prompted retaliation. The Houthis sought to trammel the Salafis' influence in Dammaj in 2011 by laying siege to the entire area from October to December 2011 and cutting off food and medical access. The International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC) reported more than 100 people killed in the conflict, including four children who died of starvation and three elderly men of lack of medication.

Sanaa, however, is intimidated by the rising Houthi influence and organized military ability. The Houthis' power in Sadaa and their independent governance structure have allowed them to negotiate border security agreements with their main adversary, Saudi Arabia. This is all causing further discomfort to the policymakers in Yemen, as they grow aware of the unexpected groundswell that the Houthis generated. The Houthis are now emerging with their own political party, which is becoming increasingly popular among the Yemeni youth.

The Houthis influence need not be underestimated. While ostensibly regressive, Houthis believe that ruling is a privilege for Zaidi sects of Hashemite origin. Zaidism was the order of the day in Yemen for more than a millennia, and the Zaidi imamate rule was removed in the 1962 revolution and is likely to see a resurgence amid the prevailing corrupt political culture in Yemen.

At the heart of the Houthis' allure to the Yemeni youth is the realization that the Arab Spring revolution did not reach its full potential. While the head of the regime is gone, elements of a remaining dysfunctional system threaten a relapse. As such, there are more youth than before who are supporting the Houthis for their unrelenting opposition to the former regime and its allies. Furthermore, the Houthi notion of state sovereignty appears to many to be far better than what is currently offered by the Yemeni state where infringement on Yemen's territory has taken place with the connivance of Yemeni officials.

Meanwhile, the Houthis do not invite international sympathy with their narrow vision, nor do they seek it. Their "death to America" slogan has been a recruiting factor for the radically inclined. But if the relationship between the United States and Iran changes positively, this will have implications on the Houthi movement, which could find itself reinventing its messages to suit the political winds of Iran. It is more likely, however, that the Houthis will remain one of Iran's cards to play in the region. As the Obama administration is tinkering with its Iranian counterparts, Yemeni politicians feel the urgency to stop the Houthi movement before it transforms into a political power that the current ruling alliances cannot face.

Undoubtedly, Dammaj has tested the sincerity and commitment of the Yemeni government in its ability to protect all Yemeni citizens and contain a crisis. As the government falters, the political parties grow more confrontational. All sides of this conflict appear to be deliberately drawing more attention to themselves in a conspicuous effort to garner additional financing and recruits while the Yemeni government assumes the role of a victim, rather than an interceptor of the violence which has further inflamed the situation in the north.

Furthermore, communities in the south are watching this tragedy with fear that it could repeat itself in their neighborhoods. Southern political parties and media have tilted toward the Houthis in their reporting. The Houthis-Southern alliance, which intensified after the Arab revolution and southerners' call for session, is starting to become a nuisance for the policymakers in the capital who were used to conducting their business the "Saleh" way.

Events in Dammaj have also prompted the Group of Ten Ambassadors of the permanent five members of the U.N. Security Council, the GCC, and the European Union to issue a statement that called upon all sides to stop fighting and defuse the tensions. But most importantly, they called on the Yemeni government to resume its mediation attempts and to take whatever measures are necessary to restore security and the state's presence. The government sent a presidential committee to investigate the situation on November 6 but this came after the death toll surpassed 200 people. The question for international partners is if they are willing to be creative enough to find complementary ways to support Yemen's near-ending transitional process while helping the government address urgent needs of the community.

The current security threats in the north and the antipathetic responses by the state challenge assurances that the Yemeni government is on the right track. The effort to sustain peace should be long term, as Yemen cannot afford to have the same military conflicts experienced during the Saleh regime. Recognizing that Sadaa has some degree of autonomy and a unique culture that needs to be preserved peacefully is the first step toward real integration. But most importantly, bearing the responsibility to protect the people in Sadaa, just as much as the people in Dammaj, is crucial if the state wants to gain respect and influence.

Hailing Hellfires - On drones and Human Rights Watch Report

Hailing Hellfires

BY FATIMA ABO ALASRAR

A destroyed building as a result of fighting between AQAP and the Yemeni government in 2012, taken in June 2013. (Photo: Fatima Abo Alasrar)

Apart from the Yemeni National Dialogue Conference that has been generating good news in the press, the country is on a rapidly deteriorating course toward uncertainty. On October 18, al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP) launched a suicide attack targeting a military installation in al-Ahwar district of Abyan governorate which killed twelve soldiers and left several others wounded. This  was the same governorate that fell under control of the terrorist group of Ansar al-Sharia during the Arab Spring uprising in 2011. Despite the liberation of Abyan from the terrorist occupation, the group still conducts terrorist acts, through planting land mines in schools, kidnapping aid workers, in addition to their usual suicide tactics against military installations and local popular committees that guard the city.

The danger of AQAP in Yemen is real, but so are the drone attacks which intensified during the Obama administration. The weapon meant to target terrorists  caused great harm to Yemen in a number of ways. Human Rights Watch issued a report on October 22 highlighting the devastating effects of air strikes. The report examined six drone strikes since 2009. Although the number of investigated cases is not a representative quantitive sample on the drone strikes in Yemen (various sources document an estimated eighty-two to ninety-two drones attacks during this period), the qualitative sample made one important point abundantly clear: no matter how precise the drones, they still generate civilian casualties, destruction, fear, trauma, motherless children, loss of income, and increasing rage towards the United States.

The report did not intend to hold the United States accountable for extrajudicial killings or its violation of Yemen’s state sovereignty (it would have been futile to highlight the latter given that Yemeni President Abdrabbo Mansour Hadi is a proponent of drones). Rather, it criticizes President Barack Obama’s administration for its failure to provide a clear legal justification for the targeted killings and calls on the US government to respond to alleged violations of international law in individual attacks. Human Rights Watch questioned the US administration’s compliance and commitment to international humanitarian law under the drone program, and questioned the legal framework for US intervention in Yemen, viewing it as a party to an armed conflict between the Yemeni government and AQAP. 

President Obama’s speech at the National Defense University in May this year attempted to highlight drones as an efficient weapon of war, arguing that the precision of these weapons minimizes civilian casualties. But this instrument fails when it uses false or insufficient intelligence that leads to the killing of innocent civilians. In one of the six cases, the report sheds light on the death of a cleric who worked vigilantly to weaken the influence of AQAP by denouncing them in his sermons. In another case, a drone missile hit a minibus that killed a pregnant woman, three children, and eight other people. Not only was the intended target absent from the vehicle, but also his affiliation with a terrorist organization was never substantiated. No matter how much the Obama administration emphasizes its desire to curb civilian casualties by using drones, a trail of unintended consequences and a number of unaddressed cases fall in the policy’s wake.

Evaluating the impacts of drones is difficult in absence of concrete data and information regarding the nature of attacks, targeting, and response. The failure of the Yemeni government to acknowledge these cases and the lack of transparency on this issue threatens to offset the foundation of a democratic system though the National Dialogue Conference. Citizens will dismiss the dialogue so long as their government remains unwilling to face its responsibility towards communities affected by drones.

The United States is reticent in acknowledging the operations conducted in Yemen and therefore fails to compensate victims when damages occur. This  has generally given  the  perception that US policymakers are  indifferent towards the suffering of civilians, as if anyone in the vicinity of terrorists is fair game in the interest of US national security. The human cost of the drone program is weighing less on the consciousness of Washington, and the Yemeni government for that matter. 

The sad reality is that the Yemeni government does not advocate for scrutiny of the air strikes and many argue it even actively inhibits the discussion on drones. President Hadi, a former military man, has welcomed drones with open arms, and millions of Yemenis feel powerless in the face of this unconditional embrace for Hellfire missiles. As more and more Yemenis fall victim to the policy, they  increasingly view the United States as an asymmetrical force that can only be challenged by terrorism. In the broader context of those interpreting it as targeting Muslims as opposed to terrorists, more misunderstandings and violence will inevitably follow.

The US projection of power in Yemen stokes the fires of anger and resentment in many communities even among non-extremists, that generates the mental conditioning required for recruitment. This sense of powerlessness provides AQAP with its breeding ground to challenge the security interests of the United States and Yemen—the exact opposite effect for which the drone program was born. Human Rights Watch highlighted AQAP’s ability to capitalize on the lack of accountability towards civilian casualties through AQAP’s various propaganda outlets.

As long as Yemen continues to accept drones, stability will be a remote possibility. Drones have weakened the capacity of Yemeni districts to achieve their economic potential in an already difficult economic environment. Local communities in many cities in Yemen, most notably Abyan, repudiate the presence of AQAP. The city of Moodiya, for example, has armed itself against AQAP and stopped them from entering their district in 2011. The United States could invest in these communities without a single US soldier or drone missles. This engagement does not require arming popular committees, but rather through targeted economic and education assistance that could aid these communities in defeating the conditions in which terrorists thrive.

The United States must not wait any longer to reconsider a change of policy in Yemen. Without swift action to address the issue of metastasizing extremists, there will neither be a foreseeable halt to AQAP operations, nor the subsequent drone attacks meant to stop them. The United States must find a way to empower the Yemeni government to work with its citizens and consider the prospect of working with local popular committees. A revival of democracy programs is needed, not only with civil society, but with the Yemeni government that has a fundamental responsibility to seek the wellbeing of its people, will help prevent the persistent cycle of violence.

Yemen can no longer afford to be trapped between al-Qaeda and Hellfire missiles. Yemenis need a real partnership with the United States in order to combat the challenges threatening their stability. The United States also must realize that assisting the Yemeni government with upholding the rule of law and bringing terrorists to justice will strengthen the people's faith in the National Dialogue. It is imperative to move the Yemen-US relationship from its dysfunctional series of one night stands to a long term cooperation effort that will respect the lives and dignity of Yemeni citizens.

Fatima Abo Alasrar is an independent Middle East policy analyst from Yemen and a former OSI International Policy Fellow.

This blog was initially posted in the Atlantic Council, MENA source http://www.atlanticcouncil.org/blogs/menasource/hailing-hellfires

On the National Dialogue, and Yemen reality.

If one thinks about Yemen problems, it is almost impossible to see a way out. This is why the National Dialogue seems to be the only hope for the country. But the question here is whether the National Dialogue is truly capable of healing the wounds of the nation, or is just prolonging the inevitable. Experts are overzealous about the process for it presents a civil, comprehensive solution (Read Bob Sharp and Fahd Malaikah Commentary: Stand by Yemen | The National Interest .) The majority of Yemenis, however, do not see themselves as part of this process.

For me, this speaks to the culture of representation, or lack thereof in Yemen. People get elected in parliaments, but their constituents barely know them or how to use them. For Yemen, parliamentary seats are party seats. People vote because they have an incentive in seeing their party wins, for some, its a believe in an ideology, but for many, it is about the cutbacks and perks they receive when their party wins. Even down at the local council levels, people suffer from the "lack of representation" syndrome. The majority of local council members play a role that is similar to a counselor or a social worker --that is only if they were being good about their jobs--. They have no power that enables them to make real change in the community, but they put a band aid on the wounds of their people, and perhaps give them a sense that they are not neglected.

People in the National Dialogue are trying hard. They are working seriously, and if entire Yemen functioned that way, then it will be saved. But the question of representation remains. No matter how many people in the Southern committee join, some of the most important elements are out. This is not to say that the National Dialogue did not attempt to try to reach out to people like al-Beidh, it is simply that al-Beidh doesn't want to play within the confines of something that could look like a stable Yemen. Who supports al-Beidh? Sadly, the entire South with the exception of al-Islah in the South.

Yemenis pulled through and avoided conflicts before but it is important to remember that the former regime controlled crisis. This cannot be said for the current government that is simply trying to cope with crisis. Amid all the complicated issues, the desire to look for solutions outside of the system, and give them time for implementation becomes the only logical issue. The hype over the National Dialogue, and most recently "federalism" reflects a desire to find quick solutions for perennial problems. Forcing these solutions will come at a heavy cost for Yemenis.

The International Crisis Group understands this too well. In their report on the Southern Question, the ICG warned that "forcing through a final settlement in circumstances where basic trust, legitimacy

and consensus are lacking" could be problematic for Yemen. ICG warned that " It likely would further discredit the process, strengthen more militant Southern views and provoke dangerous brinkmanship and bloodshed." Yemenis do not necessarily understand this, and the international community is eager to make Yemen a success story by often undermining the complexity of implementation that will ensue after the National Dialogue. Yemen is taking this one day at a time, but this is a way to run a 12 Step program, not a country.

Meanwhile, Yemen's economic and security situation is not stagnant, it is on a sharp decline. The Dutch journalists that were kidnapped are almost forgotten (prayers go to them), a German diplomat was killed while a development worker from UNICEF was kidnapped right from the streets of Sana'a. Under directives from competing powers in Yemen, al-Qaeda operates selectively: Suicide bombers killed about 12 soldiers today in an attack in al-Ahwar, Abyan . Yemen is not going to implode, Yemen is imploding. Sana'a will remain the capital, the pride and joy of Yemeni elites, the ever so patient, and ambivalent.

Myopic solutions to chronic problems. Aid effectiveness in Yemen Aug 2013

This paper offers a close analysis of the key challenges facing the foreign aid sector in Yemen, and presents recommendations to the government of Yemen and the international donor community to make aid to Yemen more effective.

Read More: ‘Myopic solutions to chronic problems’? Aid effectiveness in Yemen - See more at: http://www.demdigest.net/blog/2013/08/myopic-solutions-to-chronic-problems-aid-effectiveness-in-yemen/#sthash.PGKWBYa5.dpuf

Yemen’s Fitful Dialogue - By Fatima Abo Alasrar | The Middle East Channel

Yemen’s Fitful Dialogue - By Fatima Abo Alasrar | The Middle East Channel

Yemen’s fitful dialogue

Posted By Fatima Abo Alasrar  Friday, September 6, 2013 - 4:20 PM 

It wasn't too long ago when Yemen launched its ostensibly inclusive National Dialogue process. The conference, which started on March 18, was meant to mend the wounds of the society and lead to the promulgation of the Yemeni constitution. But whoever thought that six months were sufficient for reconciliation and change was overly ambitious. The conference uncovered deep-rooted differences that confounded its participants and further polarized discussions, leading to a further indefinite delay.

In order to salvage the situation, the government of Yemen issued a statement on August 21 apologizing to the people of the southern, eastern, and northern provinces of the country for the wars and military campaigns launched during the Saleh regime. At the outset, the move seemed to be mature and reconciliatory, but it had counter effects on the ground. The apology came across as insipid at a time when the government has been either aggressive or ambivalent toward these areas. To make matters worse, the government exerted no effort in conducting consultations on the draft prior to issuing the statement. If it had done so, it would have probably been advised to remove some of its belligerent language that has inflamed, rather than quelled, the fury of many Yemenis. 

There is little evidence that the current government is capable of addressing different societal grievances that were unleashed after the Arab Spring uprisings. Yemen is imploding in more than one region: The Southern secessionist Hirak movement is controlling the South, the Tihami Hirak movement recently emerged to protest the disenfranchisement of its region, and the Northern city of Sadaa has been left to fight the Salafis with minimal protection from the government. Other cities like Marib and al-Jawf, which were previously out of control, still maintain their dangerous reputations. The government and Friends of Yemen have shown that their attention is focused on the political process in Sanaa, and have scant ability when it comes to responding to crisis outside of the capital.

The National Dialogue turned into a self-indulgent process more concerned with placating politicians than serving people. As pressure on achieving a successful outcome mounts, politicians resort to striking deals that are incongruent with their constituencies. This is conspicuous in the case of the Southern representatives who were cherry picked to advocate for federalism, in lieu of the right of self-determination, for which the majority of the South is asking.

It is perhaps time to realize that the great expectations of the National Dialogue Conference that were envisaged at the beginning need to be tempered. At the start of the process, policymakers felt that this is the only way to save the country from a real crisis, and as such downplayed any challenges. The international players, too, were eager to present Yemen as a successful case for the Arab Spring, remaining unusually positive on the dialogue. While some level of overzealousness at the start of the dialogue was expected -- as well as the lethargy toward the end -- the polarization that followed was not. Yemen today is more divided and further from a consensus than it was six months ago.

In the halls of the Movenpick hotel, the National Dialogue Conference comprises an impressive gathering of different strands of Yemeni elites with a disenchanting sense of partisanship. It is akin to walking into a spectacular wedding where no one wants to get married. Granted that top intellectuals, activists and civil society groups are present, the majority of these participants (besides the 10 percent parliamentarians) are not people who would get elected at any given point in time. Power and influence in the Movenpick reside with individuals who either have party affiliation or had former cabinet positions.

The General People's Congress and Islah Party representatives have an astute alliance in the conference; they both are firmly focused on reducing the rising threat of the Houthis who seem to have garnered a countrywide popularity that could challenge them at polling stations. As such, Sanaa based politicians trivialize issues that seem to be less threatening. Fiery and contentious politics such as the secessionist demands in the South are exclusive to the Southern region, which does not constitute any electoral majority. Southerners are outnumbered demographically, represented by different polarizing figures, and their plight is isolated from the majority. This is all too convenient for elites in the capital who sideline Southern politics, frequently capitalizing on the leadership divide among the Southern ranks.

There is a crisis of confidence intensifying in the National Dialogue and spilling over to the country. Mainstream politicians may show humility, but they cunningly exercise control. Just recently, senior Northern-based leaders from the National Dialogue cobbled together some deals purportedly to save the dialogue process and the future of the country; this was done without the inclusion of all participants, especially the Southerners who felt betrayed and protested the "cooked-up process." As a result, around 85 Southern representatives suspended their participation from the dialogue based on the secretive nature of informal coalitions. The absence of the Southern participants now is filling the dialogue with ambiguity and caused a further delay to the process, which was supposed to end this month.

It is well known that the South is now beyond the control of the government of Yemen. The Southern street is rife with resentment over the current economic situation and fraught with instability. There is a protest in the South at every national and symbolic Yemeni holiday calling against unity. The ongoing rage is fuelled by current and former Southern leaders who vehemently believe in secession. But what exactly is the government doing to bridge the gap with the South? Absolutely every wrong action from the authoritarian handbook. The government ostensibly promises development and change, while hiding, minimizing, and dismissing the desire of the South for self-determination.

Many activists believe that the call for secession is a tactic intended only to raise the bar high in order to score points in the negotiations over federalism. Given the only two choices between secession and federalism, the latter appears to be the lesser of two evils. But if federalism is the only option for Yemen, the street has certainly not caught up with it. Furthermore, the National Dialogue has done very little to explain the haphazard ideas for federalism to the public. Many regions in Yemen desire some sort of administrative and financial autonomy but are fearful that a federal system will still not protect them from the greedy elites who have always managed to find creative ways to exploit their people.

The National Dialogue should tread carefully when it comes to negotiating the new administrative plans. The past period raised enough red flags that should prompt an assessment on the effectiveness of this process: there is reluctance in achieving consensus, delay in decision making, and secretive deals among participants which have broken confidence in the process. As it is, the current design of negotiations risks political positions hardening. Furthermore, the political focus overshadowed the economic reality. In order to show real commitment to change, the government of Yemen and donors including the Gulf Cooperation Council (GCC) will have to work at making an economic investment that extends outside of Movenpick-land to the real one.

Fundamentally, the process needs to shift toward making the government of Yemen work for the people through providing much needed basic services while working on the constitutional process. More attention has to be given to the polarizing politics of the North-South divide. The first step is acknowledging that this divide exists; otherwise Yemen will find itself conceding political space to extremists of every stripe who appear to be more in tune with the frustrated society.

Fatima Abo Alasrar is an independent Middle East policy analyst from Yemen and a former OSI International Policy Fellow. This article was first published in Foreign Policy on September 6, 2013

Yemen's Real Blackout

Hundreds of thousands gathered in Sahat al-Aroud, in Aden, to show their support for southern independence, May 21, 2013. (photo by Fatima Abo al-Asrar)

By: Fatima Abo al-Asrar for Al-Monitor Posted on May 31.

Apart from constant power outages, a mercurial National Dialogue in the capital, and the unpredictable threat of al-Qaeda in the Arabian Peninsula (AQAP), Yemen appears relatively settled in its usual state of dysfunctional normalcy. Yet just a day before the country’s national celebrations of North-South unification, hundreds of thousands arrived in Aden from all corners of the South calling for independence. The protests, which were organized by the secessionist movement al-Hirak, began on the morning of May 21 and lasted until midnight. Needless to say, Yemeni national television did not broadcast or announce the event. The only foreign correspondent covering the protests was a reporter for a Russian television channel.

About This Article

Summary : The transitional government in Sanaa appears to be repeating past mistakes and approaches in dealing with southern secessionist movements. Author: Fatima Abo al-AsrarPosted on: May 31 2013 Categories : Originals  Yemen  Security

At a time of high democratic rhetoric brought to the region by the Arab Spring, not much has changed for the South of Yemen. An alarming crackdown on freedom of expression by the transitional government since President Ali Abdullah Saleh was ousted in 2011 shows no sign of easing any time soon. In March 2012, the offices of Al Jazeera  and al-Arabiya were raided, with bureau chiefs interrogated over the coverage of southern unrest. The Committee to Protect Journalists reported on its website that Fathi bin Lazrek, editor-in-chief of Aden al-Ghad, received an anonymous death threat on May 7. The message urged him to stop his reporting on the South or risk having his newspaper’s premises burnt down — with him inside.

Despite its current state of general disorganization, the transitional government has become quite creative in its suppression of national movements. Rather than outright confrontation, it engages a variety of ploys to isolate movements from international attention, fearing that more “traditional” tactics of using force might garner unwarranted attention and sympathy for such groups. The new policy involves media blackouts of events combined with the intimidation of reporters, preventing them from visiting the South. Checkpoints in Lahj and Abyan have also been fortified with central security officers in an attempt to stop protesters reaching Aden. Some of these officers exchanged gunfire with protesters the day before the May 21 demonstrations.

The scenario is worryingly reminiscent of the 2003 Houthi rebellion in the North, where an uprising, for ideological and political reason, took hold of the city of Sada'a, igniting a war that cost thousands of lives. Rather than having a calming effect, information blackouts in Sada'a galvanized many people in Yemen against Houthis while intensifying their feelings of alienation, prompting the movement to seek alliances with aggressive regional actors and thus further exacerbating conflict. It is disconcerting that the transitional government expects the same tactics used ten years ago to yield different results vis-à-vis the southern movement today.

The dominant chants during the demonstration in Aden were not the kind that Sanaa would like to hear: “No to dialogue, no to negotiations — We are an independent Southern nation!” But in reality, southerners do not need to chant it out loud to make it true: There is no trace of government in the South. Aden may boast some central security and military police at checkpoints, but places like Lahj, Yafa'a, al-Dhala'a and Abyan have no real government presence beyond governorates offices and bill pay service centers. Even police offices are deserted in the majority of these areas. The situation in the South today is a far cry from its former position of prosperity two decades ago.

While it is understandable that government officials are concerned about the influence of secessionist voices, their deliberate intimidation of domestic and international journalists is unacceptable. Someinternational non-governmental organizations operating in the South are careful not to voice opinions on sensitive “internal affairs” issues for fear of retribution from the government.

But who, exactly, is acting on behalf of the “government” now? The current government is comprised of a loose coalition of individuals with divergent political and economic interests, most often unilaterally pushing their own party agendas. Nevertheless, it is no secret that the main drivers of official public policy within the current transitional government are a mélange of Islah party affiliates desperately seeking to strengthen their grip on the South along with disgruntled former security forces long accustomed to employing intimidation and repression to enforce their will. The majority of the southerners refer to this largely unsavory association as the “Tribal Militia of Government.”

Assassination campaigns are intensifying, such as the sophisticated murder of former southern air force officers that took place on May 8 in Daba village in Lahj. The three brigadiers — Talal bin Shihab, Mohsen al-Bagdadi and Nasser Abdullah — were killed in cold blood, and the event was falsely pinned on AQAP initially before local pressure mounted for an investigation. The pervasiveness of human rights violations in the South and lack of response from the international community has led the majority of southerners to believe that they have been completely abandoned in their struggle.

As far as the international community is concerned, secession is an extremely unappealing prospect. Yemen is potentially threatened by an unstable Somalia to its left, a peculiar interest from Iran in both the Houthis and Hirak, and an al-Qaeda recurring presence. At this stage in Yemen's political development, no one is in a position to turn their back on the National Dialogue process that started in March. The international community is furthermore not inclined to spend resources outside the capital on a precarious southern gambit.

Regardless of al-Hirak's secessionist logic, a population that feels disenfranchised is not in anyone's interest. The South is angry and impatient about the lack of visibility and the politicization of their desire for independence. That the government is discussing the southern cause in the capital, yet unable to take notice of the political dynamics in Aden, raises doubts on the legitimacy and purpose of the National Dialogue.

Furthermore, the violations that occurred in the South during the time of transition by security forces and small elites have further inflamed al-Hirak and encouraged the movement to seek alliances with external forces and anachronistic leaders. The government's ambivalence toward the South has helped in opening up the space for spoilers, mainly the former southern president Ali Salem al-Beidh, who is intent on achieving his objectives for secession through any and all possible means.

Some officials in the capital contend that the current southern crisis is driven by a selfish desire of southerners to keep their resources to themselves, implying that secession is a product of greed and opportunity. Sanaa, however, is not maintaining its firm grip on the South out of sheer benevolence either: Oil and gas resources exported from the South have been the backbone of the Yemeni economy for more than 20 years. The government of Yemen understands too well that the southern region has a strong potential for further untapped extractive resources. A disunited Yemen, therefore, would primarily impact the capital and its periphery, which has long been the primary beneficiary of the country’s wealth.

Meanwhile, the tally of southern grievances steadily increases. The government of Yemen needs to deal with movements seeking to control the South, and investigate allegations of human rights violations. The international community should also resist the temptation to ignore al-Hirak to appease Sanaa, which is likely to encourage the government to sidestep the opposition, thereby pushing al-Hirak to align with forces of aggression. They must acknowledge the possibility that Yemen may not be the successful Arab Spring model as once envisioned by its leaders. The current political inertia in the South is bound to break, with dangerous consequences. Official censorship and repression will backfire against the capital, and lead Yemen toward the bleak path of conflict that it is trying to avoid.

Fatima Abo al-Asrar is an independent Middle East policy analyst from Yemen and a former OSI International Policy fellow. Pamela Kilpadi, a doctoral researcher with the University of Bristol School for Policy Studies, contributed to this article. This article first appeared in al-Monitor on May 31, 2013

Read more: http://www.al-monitor.com/pulse/originals/2013/05/yemen-transitional-government-mistakes-south.html#ixzz2etzSf1zR

Saving the South of Yemen from Itself - By Fatima Abo Alasrar | The Middle East Channel

Saving the South of Yemen from Itself - By Fatima Abo Alasrar | The Middle East Channel

Saving the South of Yemen from Itself

Posted By Fatima Abo Alasrar  Tuesday, May 7, 2013 - 9:26 AM  

Mr. Hassan al-Yafa'ei, head of the secessionist "Hirak" in al-Houtta South of Yemen, spoke with passion and grief about his region. He is filled with indignation over the unfair discrimination of the South. He is completely convinced, however, that the 1986 civil war is a historical incident that will not be repeated. In his view, the almost 10,000 deaths that occurred in a single month is just an "aberrant phenomenon." Al-Yafa'ei, just like many other Southerners, underplays the possibility of violence occurring if a Southern secession should take place. Such incessant denial of the possibility of the past repeating itself is convenient for many Southerners who want to become an independent Southern nation -- putting the chapter of "Unity gone bad" behind them.

The question of "What will happen to the South if a secession takes place?" has rarely been probed by Hirak. The mechanisms of this desired disunion are left to the same politicians who plunged the South of Yemen to its previous fate of wars and instability. And once again, sentiments of people in the streets are high on "self-determination" rhetoric, without adequately thinking through how this step would resolve their political differences and leaders' penchant for popular exploitation. 

Meanwhile, in their attempt to find "reasonable" voices to represent the Southern interest in the National Dialogue, the dialogue committee wasn't able to capture the essence of the street in its selection. The dichotomy between the street movement, which is calling for secession, and the National Dialogue, which is contemplating federalism, should be worrying for the capital. Violence is more likely to erupt at the end of the dialogue because the most influential factions controlling the Southern street are not directly involved. It is expected that these factions will revoke any agenda that doesn't reconcile with their own.

Struggles for representation over Southern politics have already begun, yielding a plethora of actors with divergent interests. The clearest view of this political fragmentation can be seen through the lens of the Yemeni diaspora: Haidar Abu Bakr al-Attas, Ali Salem al-Beidh, and Ali
Nasser who are attempting to influence the political scene from their different regional locations of Cairo, Riyadh, and Beirut, backed by regional agendas. While Al-Hirak al-Janoubi "The Southern Movement" was first initiated in 2007 by retired army personnel seeking reinstatements and better pensions, it eventually became a Southern-wide movement representative of the people's demands for justice, equality, and now secession. The movement's core leadership, which consisted of esteemed figures with fresh portfolios, such as Hassan Ba'aum, and Nasser al-Nouba, is now completely overshadowed by the power and influence of the former, older, Southern leadership.

Most worrying for many Yemenis is the resurgence of former Southern President Ali Salem al-Beidh, who is presumed to be receiving support from Iran. While this is not proven, many draw conclusions from al-Houthis -- the northern group that enjoys strong support from Iran -- which support the Southern right for self-determination. Iran has long desired to distance Yemen from any U.S. influence and has strategically sought to use the weakest points in the Yemeni regions to garner more support for its agenda.

Although many would prefer to dismiss it, al-Beidh's power is steadily growing and dominating the street movement. He sits in Beirut, Lebanon, advocating "disengagement" on his television channel Aden-Liveand dispatching his envoys to Cairo (where many negotiations among current and former Southern leaders are taking place). He has skillfully capitalized on the recent dynamic of North-South rancor in an attempt to garner more support for his agenda.

Al-Beidh's popularity should not be underestimated; it stems from supporting the street movement where he is creatively -- and sometimes destructively -- channeling its anger. Much to his misfortune though, the former president is not viewed as the most benevolent leader for the South. Many blame al-Beidh for initiating the South's decline as the primary figure responsible for plummeting the country into undesired unification back in 1990 in order to escape a coup d'état that was lurking on his presidency.

In a similar vein, the government of Yemen's attitude toward the different dynamics in the South lacks perceptiveness and caused it to fail in gaining the Southerner's popular support for the National Dialogue. The government has often underplayed or overplayed certain aspects of the political life in the South focusing only on the violent and unusual. For example, the government depicts the Civil Disobedience, which takes place in Aden every Saturday and Wednesday, as a violent movement that "terrorizes" the southerners; when the majority of people in the South see it as a continuum to the uprising and participate in it willingly, and peacefully.

Furthermore, there is a blackout on national television on the number of people who fall dead or injured in clashes with the army in the South; yet there is a focus on displaying army casualties who are targeted during demonstrations. Reputable southern-based newspapers, like al-Ayam, have been suspended from publication, or have no circulation in the capital like Aden al-Ghad. So while there is an attempt to integrate North-South politics at the national level through dialogue, the dynamics of the situation on the ground are marching in a different direction.

While all of Yemen has suffered its fair share of bad governance, the South was to fall furthest as it was standing up on a perceived stable administrative and economic platform prior to unification. Many experts argue that the support of the former USSR to the former People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (PDRY) was key to the disillusionment of the Southerners about their wealth, but the Southerners' core economic grievance stems from the rapid depletion and exploitation of their natural gas and oil resources without reward.

The disenfranchisement of the South acutely intensified after the 1994 North-South civil war, as Southerners were discharged en masse from the military, and laid off from many civil service positions (a decision that the government is attempting to reverse by reinstating several thousand Southerners to the civil service). There is also a strong perception of "sabotage through neglect," as many industrial factories were seized through non-transparent bids by notable Northerners who shut down the factories and sent many workers to the precarious fate of unemployment. The Southerners felt they were denied their rights and treated as second-class citizens.

Amid all this, there is a conspicuous political vacuum and an absence of state in the South. Local popular committees in Abyan took over the protection of their cities from violent terrorist networks, while in Aden, distrust in the security apparatus caused people to instigate neighborhood watches, which are in effect everyday after 11:00 p.m., in order to deter criminal activities and stop suspicious behavior. There is an eerie sense of insecurity that permeates in all corners of Aden, Lahj, and Abyan. Decreasing dependence on state resources for protection is causing the Southerners to believe that they are better off governing their own territories.

While the grievances of the Yemenis in the South are legitimate, their clamor is steadily spiraling out of control. The South is in a crisis of over-representation in sentiments and under-representation of reason, and if secession takes place, it will further unleash southern power struggles that are most likely to result in new regional insurgencies. National dialogue as it stands, is not capable of stemming the influence of this violent fury in the South.

Sanaa must begin to seriously address secessionists' concerns to avert a real crisis. The National Dialogue process is a step in the right direction, but more attention needs to be given to the voice of the street movement. Additional bold actions must be taken simultaneously to remedy some of the root causes of popular discontent and indignation. The government must also rapidly implement sound economic and political procedures that address the core grievances of the South, with the aid of donors. It is important that the international community engages in the South directly, through economic and diplomatic means in order to boost chances for reconciliation. Therefore, some interventions need to be Southern based through short and medium-term development and economic assistance to enable the achievement of quick results on the ground.

The Southerners should also learn from their own violent history, and attempt to find realistic solutions that could meet Sanaa halfway; as pinning their decline on "a dysfunctional unity" could deprive the Southerners from a golden opportunity to correct its path. Saving the South must become a top political priority of all involved, before Yemen splinters into more factions than it can handle.

Fatima Abo Alasrar is an independent Middle East policy analyst from Yemen and a former OSI International Policy Fellow. This article first appeared in Foreign Policy on May 6, 2013

Read More: http://mideast.foreignpolicy.com/posts/2013/05/07/saving_the_south_of_yemen_from_itself

Yemen's perilous change FATIMA ABO AL-ASRAR

Yemen's perilous change

FATIMA ABO AL-ASRAR 13 April 2011

While the fate of Yemen's president remains unclear, so does the country’s future. The fundamental question is whether the unrest can succeed in addressing the aspirations of Yemen’s youth, or further empower its entrenched tribal leaders.

In Yemen, the living struck a deal with the dead. The specter of 52 lives taken on Friday, March 18 at Change Square in Sana’a continues to haunt the president. Regardless of whether Ali Abdullah Saleh orchestrated the bloody crackdown against peaceful protesters himself, a pro-government body demonstrated a shocking lack of restraint, undermining all efforts for dialogue. Since then, hundreds have been reported killed and many more injured in successive waves of massive anti-government protests.

March 18 has truly been the tipping point for Yemen, with top government officials defecting en masse in protest against the violence. Even ‘allies’ in the U.S. and among members of the Gulf Cooperation Council have been distancing themselves from Saleh. Lessons from Tunisia and Egypt demonstrate that with such a groundswell of protest against the atrocities, there is virtually no stopping the popular will.

Yemen’s military elites have also picked up on this crucial lesson from Arab neighbors, while noting the praise and support bestowed on the Egyptian military by both revolutionaries and U.S. leaders for their protection of protesters. So when General Ali Mohsen—commander of the First Armored Division of the military—appeared on TV on March 21 announcing his defection, it sent shivers down the revolutionaries’ spines, injecting the opposition movement with a renewed impetus. The general’s vow to protect the protesters changed the rules of the game.

A few days later, the buzz was gone. People feared the resurgence of an ever more powerful status quo political system, one that can obliterate all aspirations for genuine change. Despite Mohsen’s crucial role in supporting the protesters, Yemenis became skeptical of his true intentions. What the general hopes to gain from joining the opposition and his potential role in Yemen’s future politics remains unclear.

Changing positions with the political winds is not the exception to the rule in Yemeni politics, but perhaps the rule itself. Tribes in Yemen have a notorious reputation for such cynical survival skills. Nevertheless, the military element in the currently chaotic picture is alarming in light of Arab revolutionary history, checkered as it is with military men seizing power and thwarting people’s desire for real change.

Facebook is not enough

In Yemen’s Change Square (Sahat al-Tagheire—or ‘revolutionary camping zone’), youth dominate the scene and drive the protesters' agenda. The atmosphere of the protests is quite festive, with songs, poetry, Qat chews—all the necessary components to keep spirits high.

The ‘youth’ movement is not confined to any particular age group or party affiliation, but its backbone consists of young people without tribal affiliations who take little or no interest in existing political parties and vehemently oppose the involvement of tribes or islamists in the next government. The message of the youth is the message of the opposition movement—a message of nonviolence, democracy, and unity.

Sadly, these youngsters are limited in number, relatively unorganized and dwarfed by the size and clout of tribes and opposition parties, which also have their share of young faces. After all, a full 50 percent of Yemen’s population is below the age of 24.

Although the lack of organization within the youth movement can be viewed as a disadvantage, it is also invigorating—providing the necessary breathing room to express opinions beyond ‘right’ or ‘wrong’ attitudes. There is no fear of breaking rules or misrepresenting party lines. Yet, an important question about the youth movement remains unanswered: If its members were to come to power, exactly how would they translate their revolutionary spirit for change?

Like many Arab youngsters, those in Yemen tend to grow up believing that their role in the country’s political life is limited to voicing their demands to political parties or the government. They lack experience in building political coalitions, projecting common goals, or conceptualizing political platforms. Even more worrying is their evident lack of capacity to organize, opening up the possibility of their members being recruited and co-opted by various established political forces.

Lessons from Egypt are still fresh: On March 19th, the Muslim Brotherhood edged closer to political dominance by amassing 77 percent of referendum votes, while the Egyptian youth movement and other secularists instrumental in bringing hundreds of thousands of people into the streets for demonstrations gained relatively little popular support. If Yemeni youth fail to organize before the president is gone, their cry for change may be in vain.

(c) Mohammed al-Suleihi

Yemen's dubious democracy

What good did democracy do for Yemen? The country enjoys a multi-party system with an independent civil society, parliament, and relatively advanced media laws. In fact, international observers provided Yemen’s current president with an important seal of approval by labeling his elections as free and fair. This ‘democratic phenomenon’ appeared to be a puzzling anomaly to outsiders. The leadership’s promising early pronouncements soon lost their luster in practice, or lack thereof. Popular disdain for the state of the country’s political system has been steadily growing ever since. What, exactly, went wrong?

One explanation undoubtedly involves the inherent difficulty in a country as poor as Yemen to encourage people to vote and take an active interest in the development of a well-functioning political system. Economic performance and the ability of government to deliver social services are fundamental to democratic progress. Yemen has consistently ranked at the bottom of the Human Development Index for the past ten years—an exceedingly difficult foundation on which to nurture a healthy democracy.

Democracy in Yemen has also served to legitimize a complex informal political system: The tribes. Tribal associations fortified their positions through the ballot box. The highly personalized nature of the country’s leadership undermined public trust in the sincerity of the government’s interest in popular political participation.

Even the opposition sought to use the ‘democratic’ political system to advance the tribal and group interests of a narrow elite as opposed to the wider interests of the population or even their own constituencies. Take the late Sheikh Abdullah bin Hussain al-Ahmar as an example. He served as the Speaker of the Yemeni Parliament, head of the opposition Islamist Islah party, and head of the powerful Hashid tribal confederation. After he passed away, his son Sadeq al-Ahmar succeeded him.

This cycle of patronage cannot be broken. It is quite naive to expect that democracy in Yemen is now poised to empower independent, educated youth based on merit.  This applies to the present-day revolutionary movement as well. One of the main drivers for change in Yemen is currently none other than Sheikh Hameed al-Ahmar, a businessman and influential member of the opposition Islah party, brother of the current Sheikh of Hashid, son of the previous Sheikh of Hashid.

Sheikh Hameed al-Ahmar is part of Yemen’s malady, a cornerstone of an elitist tribal system that has grown stronger over the past three decades. Hameed understands this well, which is why he announced that he has no interest in the presidency. Yet, his generous support to the ‘youth’ and Islah party is not entirely altruistic. Hameed’s struggle with President Saleh carries with it the distinct flavor of political vendetta, with the youth and Islah party merely pawns for the advancement of his personal goals in a perilous political game.

It is worth noting that the opposition silently expresses their intention of purging Hameed from the movement—once the immediate political goal of toppling Saleh has been achieved. But this is simply a gambit they are not in a position to make.

A revolution for all?

In this context, many Yemenis are not feeling warm and fuzzy with the public defections of political personnel from the government and their stated desire to ‘join the revolution.’ There is real fear that tribal and islamist interference in politics could overshadow the dreams of the revolutionaries. Have the politicians and diplomats defected because they are supporting change, or simply to save themselves from going down with President Saleh?

While the first opposition members to come out onto Yemeni streets were primarily young protesters, other forces quickly jumped on the bandwagon. There has been strength in numbers thus far, but the current number and diversity of players, which includes youth, socialists, military, clerics, islamists and tribes, would appear to be practically unmanageable as a unified force in the long run.

Some voices in the opposition would like to draw a line separating the good (revolutionaries), from the bad (elites); a step that would impair the prospects for post-revolutionary nation building. The fear is that the country might fall back into the trap of exploiting the same inflammatory rhetoric that led to the strong cleavages between the north and south following the 1994 civil war, where southerners were often labeled as separatists or ‘infisalli,’ while the ‘exploitative’ northerners were often referred to with the derogatory name ‘dehbashi’ (the surname of a fictional Yemeni television character—a frustrated, clumsy citizen of Sana’a).

There is no textbook ‘step-by-step guide’ for a successful revolutionary transition of course. But if Yemenis favor ethnic, tribal or narrow political agendas over the broader objective of building a national consensus on key policy challenges facing the country, this historic opportunity for developing a healthy democracy in Yemen could easily be lost.

Can we wait until January for Saleh to leave?

Yes and No. The longer President Saleh holds on to power, the harder it will be for the revolutionaries to maintain the momentum and morale necessary to force real political change. Those elites who have distanced themselves from the president will also become more and more vulnerable, perhaps even finding themselves targets of assassination attempts if they possess information potentially harmful to the ruling establishment. Fears over such retaliation could prove fundamental in making things ‘unworkable’ for the president and his supporters.

However, the risks are grave for both sides. Chaos can erupt from either direction. The majority of people were under the assumption that Saleh would surrender in a quick exit similar to that of Mubarak or bin Ali. “This is not a movie that ends with the president leaving,” a friend noted. A poorly negotiated departure by Saleh could unlock a Pandora’s box of competing interests. Yemen’s elaborate and well-armed tribal structure has much to lose if the president is suddenly overthrown.

The focus needs to shift from an immediate departure to a peaceful departure. Yemenis do not deserve further battles over leadership and power. Three critical factors would help guarantee a peaceful transition in Yemen: Firstly, the president would need to step down while attempting to reconcile the interests of various competing groups. Secondly, the revolutionaries must be able to unite their vastly different political agendas into a popular political platform. Finally, tribal and military leaders must be willing to value and support the aspirations of the popular revolution.

The rest of the world can assist in this process by helping the revolutionaries—Yemen’s new generation—to develop strategies for building and maintaining effective and popular government institutions, while helping to support national human and economic development programs. And, first and foremost, creating the space for Yemenis to take charge of their own destiny.

This article first appeared in OpenDemocracy, 13 April 2011