If one thinks about Yemen problems, it is almost impossible to see a way out. This is why the National Dialogue seems to be the only hope for the country. But the question here is whether the National Dialogue is truly capable of healing the wounds of the nation, or is just prolonging the inevitable. Experts are overzealous about the process for it presents a civil, comprehensive solution (Read Bob Sharp and Fahd Malaikah Commentary: Stand by Yemen | The National Interest .) The majority of Yemenis, however, do not see themselves as part of this process.
For me, this speaks to the culture of representation, or lack thereof in Yemen. People get elected in parliaments, but their constituents barely know them or how to use them. For Yemen, parliamentary seats are party seats. People vote because they have an incentive in seeing their party wins, for some, its a believe in an ideology, but for many, it is about the cutbacks and perks they receive when their party wins. Even down at the local council levels, people suffer from the "lack of representation" syndrome. The majority of local council members play a role that is similar to a counselor or a social worker --that is only if they were being good about their jobs--. They have no power that enables them to make real change in the community, but they put a band aid on the wounds of their people, and perhaps give them a sense that they are not neglected.
People in the National Dialogue are trying hard. They are working seriously, and if entire Yemen functioned that way, then it will be saved. But the question of representation remains. No matter how many people in the Southern committee join, some of the most important elements are out. This is not to say that the National Dialogue did not attempt to try to reach out to people like al-Beidh, it is simply that al-Beidh doesn't want to play within the confines of something that could look like a stable Yemen. Who supports al-Beidh? Sadly, the entire South with the exception of al-Islah in the South.
Yemenis pulled through and avoided conflicts before but it is important to remember that the former regime controlled crisis. This cannot be said for the current government that is simply trying to cope with crisis. Amid all the complicated issues, the desire to look for solutions outside of the system, and give them time for implementation becomes the only logical issue. The hype over the National Dialogue, and most recently "federalism" reflects a desire to find quick solutions for perennial problems. Forcing these solutions will come at a heavy cost for Yemenis.
The International Crisis Group understands this too well. In their report on the Southern Question, the ICG warned that "forcing through a final settlement in circumstances where basic trust, legitimacy
and consensus are lacking" could be problematic for Yemen. ICG warned that " It likely would further discredit the process, strengthen more militant Southern views and provoke dangerous brinkmanship and bloodshed." Yemenis do not necessarily understand this, and the international community is eager to make Yemen a success story by often undermining the complexity of implementation that will ensue after the National Dialogue. Yemen is taking this one day at a time, but this is a way to run a 12 Step program, not a country.
Meanwhile, Yemen's economic and security situation is not stagnant, it is on a sharp decline. The Dutch journalists that were kidnapped are almost forgotten (prayers go to them), a German diplomat was killed while a development worker from UNICEF was kidnapped right from the streets of Sana'a. Under directives from competing powers in Yemen, al-Qaeda operates selectively: Suicide bombers killed about 12 soldiers today in an attack in al-Ahwar, Abyan . Yemen is not going to implode, Yemen is imploding. Sana'a will remain the capital, the pride and joy of Yemeni elites, the ever so patient, and ambivalent.
For me, this speaks to the culture of representation, or lack thereof in Yemen. People get elected in parliaments, but their constituents barely know them or how to use them. For Yemen, parliamentary seats are party seats. People vote because they have an incentive in seeing their party wins, for some, its a believe in an ideology, but for many, it is about the cutbacks and perks they receive when their party wins. Even down at the local council levels, people suffer from the "lack of representation" syndrome. The majority of local council members play a role that is similar to a counselor or a social worker --that is only if they were being good about their jobs--. They have no power that enables them to make real change in the community, but they put a band aid on the wounds of their people, and perhaps give them a sense that they are not neglected.
People in the National Dialogue are trying hard. They are working seriously, and if entire Yemen functioned that way, then it will be saved. But the question of representation remains. No matter how many people in the Southern committee join, some of the most important elements are out. This is not to say that the National Dialogue did not attempt to try to reach out to people like al-Beidh, it is simply that al-Beidh doesn't want to play within the confines of something that could look like a stable Yemen. Who supports al-Beidh? Sadly, the entire South with the exception of al-Islah in the South.
Yemenis pulled through and avoided conflicts before but it is important to remember that the former regime controlled crisis. This cannot be said for the current government that is simply trying to cope with crisis. Amid all the complicated issues, the desire to look for solutions outside of the system, and give them time for implementation becomes the only logical issue. The hype over the National Dialogue, and most recently "federalism" reflects a desire to find quick solutions for perennial problems. Forcing these solutions will come at a heavy cost for Yemenis.
The International Crisis Group understands this too well. In their report on the Southern Question, the ICG warned that "forcing through a final settlement in circumstances where basic trust, legitimacy
Meanwhile, Yemen's economic and security situation is not stagnant, it is on a sharp decline. The Dutch journalists that were kidnapped are almost forgotten (prayers go to them), a German diplomat was killed while a development worker from UNICEF was kidnapped right from the streets of Sana'a. Under directives from competing powers in Yemen, al-Qaeda operates selectively: Suicide bombers killed about 12 soldiers today in an attack in al-Ahwar, Abyan . Yemen is not going to implode, Yemen is imploding. Sana'a will remain the capital, the pride and joy of Yemeni elites, the ever so patient, and ambivalent.
